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Abstract
We give a precise picture of the computational complexity of causal relationships in Pearl’s
structural models, where we focus on causality between variables, event causality, and probabilistic
causality. As for causality between variables, we consider the notions of causal irrelevance, cause,
cause in a context, direct cause, and indirect cause. As for event causality, we analyze the complexity
of the notions of necessary and possible cause, and of the sophisticated notions of weak and actual
cause by Halpern and Pearl. In the course of this, we also prove an open conjecture by Halpern
and Pearl, and establish other semantic results. We then analyze the complexity of the probabilistic
notions of probabilistic causal irrelevance, likely causes of events, and occurrences of events despite
other events. Moreover, we consider decision and optimization problems involving counterfactual
formulas. To our knowledge, no complexity aspects of causal relationships in the structural-model
approach have been considered so far, and our results shed light on this issue.
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1. Introduction
Representing and reasoning with causal knowledge has received much attention in the
recent decade. The existing approaches to causality in the AI literature can be roughly
divided into those that have been developed as nonmonotonic formalisms (especially in
the context of logic programming) and those that evolved from (or that are closely related
to) the area of Bayesian networks.
A representative of the former is Geffner’s modal nonmonotonic logic for handling
causal knowledge [11,12], which has been inspired by default reasoning from conditional
knowledge bases. Other more specialized formalisms play an important role in dealing
with causal knowledge about actions and change, e.g., [14,24–26,29,38]; see especially
the work by Turner [38] and the references therein for an overview.
A representative of the latter is Pearl’s approach to modeling causality by structural
equations [1,10,32,33], which is central to a number of recent research efforts. In particular,
the evaluation of deterministic and probabilistic counterfactuals has been explored, which
is at the core of problems in fault diagnosis, planning, decision making, and determination
of liability [1]. Moreover, in a recent work, Halpern [16] gave an axiomatization of
reasoning about causal formulas in the structural-model approach, and explored its
computational aspects. Furthermore, it has been shown that the structural-model approach
allows a precise modeling of many important causal relationships, which can especially be
used in natural language processing [10]. In particular, it allows an elegant definition of the
important notions of actual causation and causal explanation [17–19].
Roughly speaking, the main idea behind the structural-model approach is that the world
is modeled by random variables, which may causally influence each other. The variables
are divided into background variables, which are influenced by factors outside the model,
and observable variables, which are influenced by background and observable variables.
This latter influence is described by functions for the observable variables. The following
is a simple example due to Halpern and Pearl [17–19], which illustrates the structural-
model approach.
Example 1.1 (arsonists). Suppose that two arsonists lit matches in different parts of a dry
forest, and both cause trees to start burning. Assume now that either match by itself suffices
to burn down the whole forest. In the structural-model framework, such a scenario may
be modeled as follows. We assume two binary background variables U1 and U2, which
determine the motivation and the state of mind of the two arsonists, where Ui has the
value 1 iff the arsonist i intends to start a fire. Moreover, we have three binary variables
A1, A2, and B , which describe the observable situation, where Ai has the value 1 iff the
arsonist i drops the match, and B has the value 1 iff the whole forest burns down. The
causal dependencies between these variables are expressed through functions, which say
that the value of Ai is given by the value of Ui , and that B has the value 1 iff either A1
or A2 has the value 1. These dependencies can be graphically represented as in Fig. 1.
While the semantic aspects of causal relationships in the structural-model approach
have been explored in depth (see especially the work by Pearl [33]), studies about their
computational properties are missing so far. In this paper, we try to fill this gap by giving
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Fig. 1. Causal graph.
a precise account of the complexity of deciding causal relationships in structural models.
Note that Halpern’s work [16] is orthogonal to ours, as it focuses on the computational
aspects of deciding whether a given causal formula has a causal model, while our work in
this paper deals with the complexity of deciding whether a given causal relationship holds
in a given causal model.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows (a review of the
complexity classes mentioned is provided in Section 2.4):
• We analyze the complexity of deciding causal relationships between variables in the
structural-model approach. We consider the notions of causal irrelevance, cause, cause
in a context, direct cause, and indirect cause, which have been described in [10,32,33].
It turns out that deciding these notions has a complexity among NP, co-NP, and DP,
and that hardness holds even in restricted cases.
• We analyze the complexity of deciding causal relationships between events. We
consider the notions of necessary and possible cause [10,32,33] and the sophisticated
notions of weak and actual cause by Halpern and Pearl [17]. It turns out that deciding
necessary and possible causes is complete for DP and NP, respectively, while deciding
weak and actual causes is P2 -complete in the general case, and NP-complete in the
case of binary variables.
• We prove some semantic results related to the notions of actual and weak cause. In
detail, we prove an open conjecture by Halpern and Pearl [17], which says that all
actual causes are primitive events. Furthermore, we give a new characterization of
weak cause for the case of binary variables.
• We analyze the complexity of probabilistic causal relationships. We consider the
notions of probabilistic causal irrelevance, and, in slight generalizations, of likely
causes of events, and of occurrences of events despite other events [10,32,33]. It turns
out that deciding probabilistic causal irrelevance is complete for the class C=, while
deciding the other two notions of probabilistic causality is complete for the class C.
Thus, deciding these probabilistic causal relationships is harder than co-NP. Note that
few C=-complete problems, and none in AI, were known.
• We analyze the complexity of some decision and function computation problems
involving counterfactual formulas. We show that deciding whether the probability
of a causal formula is at least α and whether the conditional probability over two
causal formulas is at least α is complete for C. Furthermore, we show that computing
marginal probabilities of causal formulas is complete for #P. We remark that our
conditional probabilities over causal formulas are a generalization of Balke and Pearl’s
counterfactual queries [1,32,33].
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Our results draw a precise picture of the complexity of structural causality. They give
useful insight for implementing decision procedures for causal reasoning in the structural-
model approach and for identifying tractable cases of such causal reasoning. Our results
show that causal relationships may be exploited in counterfactual reasoning [1,32,33]. The
results of this paper also proved useful for analyzing the complexity of reasoning about
Halpern and Pearl’s explanations [17,19], which are based on the notions of weak and
actual cause; see our companion paper [7].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains some preliminaries on
causal and probabilistic causal models, on their representation for computation, and on the
complexity classes that we encounter in this paper. In Section 3, we analyze the complexity
of causal relationships between variables. Section 4 concentrates on the complexity of
causal relationships between events, including Halpern and Pearl’s actual and weak cause.
In Section 5, we then analyze the complexity of probabilistic causal relationships. The final
Section 6 discusses the presented results and gives an outlook on future research.
In order to increase readability, some proofs and technical details have been moved to
Appendices A–C.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we give some technical preliminaries. We first recall causal and
probabilistic causal models. We then discuss some aspects on their representation, and
we finally describe the complexity classes that appear in our results.
2.1. Causal models and probabilistic causal models
We start with recalling structure-based causal and probabilistic causal models; for a
rich background, see especially [1,10,16,32,33]. Roughly speaking, the main idea behind
structure-based causal models is that the world is modeled by random variables, which may
have a causal influence on each other. The variables are divided into exogenous variables,
which are influenced by factors outside the model, and endogenous variables, which are
influenced by exogenous and endogenous variables. This latter influence is described by
structural equations for the endogenous variables.
More formally, we assume a set of random variables. Capital letters U,V,W, etc.
denote variables and sets of variables. Each variable Xi may take on values from a
nonempty finite domain D(Xi). A value for a set of variables X = {X1, . . . ,Xn} is a
mapping x :X→D(X1) ∪ · · · ∪D(Xn) such that x(Xi) ∈D(Xi); for X = ∅, the unique
value is the empty mapping ∅. The domain of X, denoted D(X), is the set of all values
for X. Lower case letters x, y, z, etc. denote values for the sets of variables X,Y,Z,
etc., respectively. Assignments of values to variables X = x are often abbreviated by the
value x . For Y ⊆ X and x ∈ D(X), we use x|Y to denote the restriction of x to Y . For
disjoint sets of variables X,Y and values x ∈ D(X),y ∈ D(Y), we use xy to denote the
union of x and y . As usual, we often identify singletons {Xi} with Xi and their values x
with x(Xi). Furthermore, we often identify the values 0 and 1 with the classical truth values
false and true, respectively.
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We are now ready to define causal models. A causal model M is a triple (U,V,F ),
whereU is a finite set of exogenous variables, V is a finite set of endogenous variables with
U ∩ V = ∅, and F = {FX |X ∈ V } is a set of functions FX :D(PAX)→D(X) that assign
a value of X to each value of the parents PAX ⊆U ∪V \ {X} of X. Every value u ∈D(U)
is also called a context. The parent relationship between the variables of M = (U,V,F )
is expressed by the causal graph for M , which is the directed graph that has U ∪ V as
the set of nodes, and a directed edge from X to Y iff X is a parent of Y , for all variables
X,Y ∈ U ∪ V . Note that the exogenous variables Y ∈ U have no ingoing edges in the
causal graph for M .
We focus here on the principal class of recursive causal models M = (U,V,F ); as
argued in [17], we do not lose much generality by concentrating on recursive causal
models. A causal model M = (U,V,F ) is recursive, if its causal graph is a directed
acyclic graph (dag). Equivalently, as the exogenous variables have no ingoing edges in
the causal graph, there exists a total ordering ≺ on V such that Y ∈ PAX implies Y ≺ X,
for all X,Y ∈ V ; that is, such that ≺ is compatible with the parent relationships between
the endogenous variables. In recursive causal models, every assignment to the exogenous
variables U = u determines a unique value y for every set of endogenous variables Y ⊆ V ,
denoted YM(u) (or simply Y (u)). In the following, M is reserved for denoting a recursive
causal model.
Example 2.1 (arsonists continued). In our introductory example, the causal model M =
(U,V,F ) is given by U = {U1,U2}, V = {A1,A2,B}, and F = {FA1 ,FA2 , FB}, where
FA1 = U1, FA2 = U2, and FB = 1 iff A1 = 1 or A2 = 1. The causal graph for M is shown
in Fig. 1. As this graph is acyclic, M is recursive.
In a causal model, we may set endogenous variables X to a value x by an “external
action”. More formally, for any causal model M = (U,V,F ), set of variables X ⊆ V , and
value x ∈D(X), the causal model MX=x = (U,V,FX=x), where
FX=x = {FY | Y ∈ V \X} ∪
{
FXi = x(Xi) |Xi ∈X
}
,
is a submodel of M . We use Mx and Fx to abbreviate MX=x and FX=x , respectively, if X
is understood from the context. Similarly, for Y⊆V , we write Yx(u) to abbreviate YMx (u).
We next add probabilistic uncertainty to causal models, where contexts serve as possible
worlds. That is, we add a probability distribution on the set of all contexts of a causal
model. More formally, a probabilistic causal model (M,P) consists of a causal model
M = (U,V,F ) and a probability function P on D(U).
Example 2.2 (arsonists continued). In our running example, a probabilistic causal model
(M,P) may be given by the uniform distribution P over D(U). Thus, P(u)= 0.25 for each
context u ∈D(U).
2.2. Model representation for computation
For computational purposes, we need a suitable representation of causal models.
Different such representations are possible, and as long as they are polynomial-time
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intertranslatable, the representation details do not matter. Our aim here is to choose a
representation which, on the one hand, admits an expressive class of causal models, and
on the other hand, does not bear intractability for simple problems which we expect to be
polynomial.
For this reason, we assume in this paper the following representation of causal models
M = (U,V,F ) and probabilistic causal models (M,P), respectively:
(1) Each function FX :D(PAX)→D(X), X ∈ V , is computable in polynomial time.
(2) The domain D(X) of each variable X ∈U ∪V is explicit, i.e., D(X)= {v1, . . . , vk} is
enumerated.
(3) P is given by a pair (f, b), where f :D(U) → {0,1,2, . . .} is a polynomial-time
computable function and b > 0 is an integer, such that P(u) = f (u)/b for every
u ∈D(U).
Assumption (1) leaves the precise representation of FX open; it could be the code of a
procedure which, on input of an arbitrary value v for PAX , computes the output FX(v) in
polynomial time, or a Boolean circuit which computes, from a binary encoding of v, the
output value. These two representations are in a sense expressive for P, since they allow for
representing any polynomial-time computable function FX using polynomial-time effort;
in practice, however, we might often have less expressive representations. For example, FX
might be encoded as a Boolean formula φ over equality atoms val(Y )= y , where val(Y )
is a function ranging over the variable domain D(Y) for Y from PAX ∪ {X} and y ∈D(Y)
is a value for Y , such that the output value is given by val(X) in a model for φ where for
each Y ∈ PAX , val(Y ) takes the value of Y as in v. Another possible representation, which
is frequently used in the context of Bayesian networks, is by a table that lists the output
values FX(v) for all v ∈D(PAX); in fact, this amounts to a restricted form of the previous
formula-based representation. Intuitively, a more restrictive form of representation requires
a larger encoding of the same function. In particular, tables can be exponentially larger
than an equivalent formula or piece of code, and thus increase the input size. However, as
discussed in Section 2.3 below, there is no difference in our complexity results regardless
of whether we use tables, formulas, or procedure code for representing the functions.
The assumption (2) takes into account that in general, we may have natural names
of the values of a domain, such as, e.g., red, green, blue for the respective colors, or
Monday, Tuesday, . . . , Sunday for the days of the week. It is, of course, possible to map
the values v1, . . . , vk of D(X) to a particular interval of integers, e.g., [0, . . . , k − 1], such
that D(X) is fully described by the size k of the domain; this encoding will, for large
domains, result in an exponential saving with respect to the space which is needed for
enumerating the domain. The reason why we do not assume this domain representation is
that, besides the use of enumerative specifications in general, some problems on causal
models that are tractable under enumerative representation might become hard under
“implicit” domain representation. For example, simply telling whether there exists some
value v such that FX(v) takes on a particular value from D(X) is NP-complete, if
we assume that FX is represented by procedural code or, equivalently, by a Boolean
circuit, as follows from well-known results (cf. [31]). However, for all the problems
that we consider, except for probabilistic likely causes (Theorem 5.12), the form of the
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domain representation (enumerative or implicit) does not affect our complexity results;
in particular, hard instances show already up if the domains contain few (in fact, at most
three) values.
Assumption (3) may look restrictive, and therefore needs some explanation. The
parameter b there helps in a normalized representation of probabilities through integers, but
is not essential and may be eliminated in a standard computational environment. Namely,
the probability function P(u) is, by assumption, computable in time |u|k for some fixed
k  0, and thus P(u) occupies at most |u|k bits. By scaling with a suitable integer b, we can
turn each P(u), represented in a standard number format, into an integer f (u)= P(u)∗b in
polynomial time; if we disregard exponents in a floating point representation, then b = 2|u|k
would be suitable. Thus, we can transform, without loss of generality, any polynomial-time
computable probability function P(u) in polynomial time into an equivalent pair (f, b).
The latter, however, relieves us from low level details of representation.
The following proposition is immediate.
Proposition 2.3. For every X,Y ⊆ V and x ∈ D(X), the values Y (u) and Yx(u), given
u ∈D(U), are computable in polynomial time.
2.3. Restricted classes of models
We pay particular attention to the classes of causal and probabilistic causal models in
which the variable domains and the input degree of the functions FX are subject to bounds.
We say that a causal modelM (respectively, probabilistic causal model (M,P)) is binary, if
|D(X)| = 2 for all X ∈ V . Furthermore,M (respectively, (M,P)) is bounded, if |PAX| k
holds for each X ∈ V , i.e., X has at most k parents, where k is an arbitrary but fixed
constant.
Note that in a bounded model, the different representations for the functions that
we have discussed in Section 2.2 are equivalent under polynomial-time computations.
That is, we can replace procedural code for computing FX in polynomial time by an
equivalent formula or table that lists all function values, and vice versa. (Observe that
an efficient transformation into a table would not be possible if domains are implicitly
represented.) As we shall see, the hardness parts of our complexity results are established
for bounded models. Thus, the precise form of function representation does not matter for
our complexity results.
2.4. Complexity classes
We assume that the reader has some familiarity with the basic concept and notions of
complexity theory, such as P, NP, complete problems and polynomial time transforma-
tions; for a background, we refer to [22,31]. The main decisional complexity classes that
we encounter in the rest of the paper are shown in Fig. 2, where arrows denote containment.
The classes P, NP, co-NP, P2 , and  
P
2 are from the Polynomial Hierarchy (PH), which is
contained in PSPACE. The class DP = {L∩L′ | L ∈NP,L′ ∈ co-NP} is the “conjunction”
of NP and co-NP. The class C is from the Counting Hierarchy (CH) of complexity classes
[37]. Informally, C contains all problems which can be expressed as deciding whether a
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Fig. 2. Containment between complexity classes.
given instance I has at least f (|I |) many polynomial size “proofs” J1, . . . , Jf (|I |) that I is
a Yes-instance, where computing f (|I |) and checking each proof Ji can be done in poly-
nomial time. The class C is known to coincide with the famous class PP (probabilistic P)
[13], which contains the problems decidable by a polynomial-time Turing machine that
accepts an input iff the majority of its runs halt in an accepting state.
The class C= is a variant of C, where “exactly f (|I |)” replaces “at least f (|I |)”. While
this difference may seem to be marginal, C and C= have quite different properties [37].
Intuitively, C= is an extension of co-NP, and has many properties of this class. Both C and
C= are contained in PSPACE, and it is widely believed that these classes are not contained
in PH. To our knowledge, no problems in AI, or any other applied field of computer science,
which are complete for C= have been reported so far. For more details on C= and C, we
refer to [37,39]. The functional analog of these classes is the well-known class #P, which is
the class of all functions f (from strings to the nonnegative integers) for which there exists
a nondeterministic polynomial-time Turing machine T such that for every input string w,
it holds that f (w) is the number of accepting runs of T on w; for more details on #P, we
refer to [22,31].
We remark that all classes C in Fig. 2 are closed under polynomial-time reductions,
i.e., if a problem Π has a polynomial-time transformation into a problem Π ′ from C,
then also Π belongs to C. Furthermore, each C has complete problems under polynomial-
time transformations, including canonical variants of the satisfiability problem (SAT), i.e.,
deciding satisfiability of a Boolean formula φ. The latter is well-known NP-complete,
while its complement, deciding unsatisfiability of φ (equivalently, whether the negation
of φ is a tautology) is co-NP-complete; deciding, given two Boolean formulas φ1 and φ2,
whether φ1 is satisfiable and φ2 is unsatisfiable is complete for DP. The classes P2 and
 P2 have complete problems in terms of deciding the truth of quantified Boolean formulas
(QBFs) ∃A∀Bφ and ∀A∃Bφ, respectively. The classes C and C= have complete problems
in terms of counting versions of SAT. Namely, deciding whether a Boolean formula φ has
at least m satisfying assignments, where m is part of the input, is complete for C, and
similarly deciding whether φ has exactly m satisfying assignments is complete for C=
(cf. [31,39]). It is not hard to show from this that the problems remain hard even if we set
m= 2n−1, where n is the number of variables (and thus m may be dropped from the input).
We refer to these variants as GE-HALFSAT and HALFSAT, respectively.2
For all problems in the previous paragraph, hardness for the respective classes holds
if in addition φ is in conjunctive normal form (CNF), except for tautology checking of
2 A popular C-complete variant of SAT is MAJSAT, i.e., deciding whether more than half of the assignments,
i.e., at least 2n−1 + 1 many satisfy φ [31]. MAJSAT is easily reduced to GE-HALFSAT, which we use for
uniformity here.
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a Boolean formula φ and for deciding ∀A∃Bφ, where hardness holds even if φ is in
disjunctive normal form (DNF). In our proofs, we often make use of this restriction.
3. Causality between variables
In this section, we analyze the complexity of deciding causal relationships between
variables due to Galles and Pearl [10]; see also [32,33]. We consider the notions of causal
irrelevance, cause, cause in a context, direct cause, and indirect cause.
3.1. Definitions
We now recall the notions of causal irrelevance, cause, cause in a context, direct cause,
and indirect cause from [10]. Let M = (U,V,F ) be a causal model, and let X,Y,Z ⊆ V
be sets of endogenous variables such that X,Y = ∅. Then,
• X is causally irrelevant to Y given Z, if for every W ⊆ V \X ∪ Y ∪ Z, u ∈ D(U),
x, x ′ ∈D(X), z ∈D(Z), and w ∈D(W), it holds Yxzw(u)= Yx ′zw(u).
• X is a cause of Y , if x, x ′ ∈D(X) and u ∈D(U) exist such that Yx(u) = Yx ′(u).
• X is a cause of Y in the context Z = z, where z ∈ D(Z), if there exist values
x, x ′ ∈D(X) and u ∈D(U) such that Yxz(u) = Yx ′z(u).
• X is a direct cause of Y , if there exist values x, x ′ ∈ D(X), u ∈ D(U), and z ∈
D(V \X ∪ Y ) such that Yxz(u) = Yx ′z(u).
• X is an indirect cause of Y , if X is a cause of Y and X is not a direct cause of Y .
Note that the above definitions are in terms of semantical properties of causal models,
and do not explicitly refer to syntactic constituents such as the causal graph G for the
causal model M . In particular, Y ∈ PAX does not imply, in general, that Y is a cause or
direct cause of X; this is because there is no requirement that the function FX must be
sensitive to each of its arguments. We remark, though, that probabilistic causal irrelevance
in stable causal models [10] coincides with path interception in their causal graphs.
We give some examples to illustrate the above causal relationships.
Example 3.1 (arsonists continued). In our running example, A1 is not causally irrelevant
to B , and A1 is not causally irrelevant to B given A2. For instance, if we set A2 ∈
V \ {A1,B} to 0, and A1 to 0 and 1, then B has the values 0 and 1, respectively. Informally,
the actions of arsonist 1 are not causally irrelevant to the state of the forest, even given the
actions of arsonist 2. In fact, A1 is a cause of B , but not a cause of B in the contextA2 = 1.
Informally, the actions of arsonist 1 are in general a cause of the state of the forest, but not
when arsonist 2 starts a fire. Finally, it is easy to verify that A1 is in fact a direct cause of B .
For instance, if we set A1 to 0 and 1, and A2 ∈ V \ {A1,B} to 0, then B has the values 0
and 1, respectively.
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Table 1
Complexity of causality between variables
Problem Complexity
X is causally irrelevant to Y given Z co-NP-complete
X is a cause of Y NP-complete
X is a cause of Y in the context Z = z NP-complete
X is a direct cause of Y NP-complete
X is an indirect cause of Y DP-complete
3.2. Results
Our results on the complexity of deciding the above notions of causality are summarized
in Table 1. In detail, deciding causal irrelevance is co-NP-complete, while deciding its
semantically complementary notions of cause, cause in a context, and direct cause is
NP-complete. Moreover, deciding indirect cause, which is the logical conjunction of cause
and the complement of direct cause, is DP-complete. It is important to point out that for
all these causal relationships, hardness holds even if M is binary and bounded, and X is a
singleton.
The following result shows that deciding causal irrelevance is co-NP-complete. Here,
we have membership in co-NP, as the complement of causal irrelevance can be decided by
guessing and checking in polynomial time. Hardness for co-NP is shown by a reduction
from the co-NP-complete problem of deciding whether a given propositional formula in
3DNF is a tautology.
Theorem 3.2. Given a causal model M = (U,V,F ) and X,Y,Z ⊆ V with X,Y =∅,
deciding whether X is causally irrelevant to Y given Z is co-NP-complete. Hardness holds
even if (1) M is binary and bounded, (2) Z is empty, (3) X is a singleton, and either (4a)
Y is a singleton or (4b) V =X ∪ Y ∪Z.
Proof. The problem is in co-NP, as a set of variables W ⊆ V \ X ∪ Y ∪ Z and values
u ∈D(U), x, x ′ ∈D(X), z ∈D(Z), and w ∈D(W) such that Yxzw(u) = Yx ′zw(u) can be
guessed and verified in polynomial time, by Proposition 2.3.
We prove co-NP-hardness by a polynomial transformation from the co-NP-complete
problem of deciding whether a given propositional formula in 3DNF φ = φ1 ∨ · · · ∨ φk on
the atoms A1, . . . ,An, where k,n 1, is a tautology.
(a) We first construct M = (U,V,F ) and X,Y,Z ⊆ V such that (1)–(3) and (4a) are
satisfied, and that X is causally irrelevant to Y given Z iff φ is a tautology.
We define the causal model M = (U,V,F ) as follows. The exogenous and endogenous
variables are defined by U = {A1, . . . ,An} and V = {A,D1, . . . ,Dk}, respectively, where
D(S)= {0,1} for all S ∈ U ∪ V . The functions F = {FS | S ∈ V } are defined as follows:
• FA = 1,
• FD1 =A∨ φ1,
• FDi =Di−1 ∨ φi for all i ∈ {2, . . . , k}.
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Fig. 3. Causal graph for co-NP-hardness of causal irrelevance for (1)–(3) and (4a).
Note that the corresponding causal graph is shown in Fig. 3. We define X,Y,Z ⊆ V
by X = {A}, Y = {Dk}, and Z = ∅. The values 0 and 1 of X are denoted by x0 and x1,
respectively. Observe that (1)–(3) and (4a) are satisfied.
It can now be shown that X is causally irrelevant to Y given Z iff φ is a tautology
(see Appendix A). Informally, any assignment w to some nonempty W ⊆ {D1, . . . ,Dk−1}
always yields the same value of Y in Mxzw and Mx ′zw . Hence, we can assume W = ∅.
Under any u ∈D(U), if X is set to x1, then Y becomes 1. Whereas, if X is set to x0, then
Y is the truth value of φ under u. That is, setting X to x0 and x1 yields the same value of Y
under any u ∈D(U) iff φ is a tautology.
(b) We next construct M = (U,V,F ) and X,Y,Z ⊆ V such that (1)–(3) and (4b) are
satisfied, and that X is causally irrelevant to Y given Z iff φ is a tautology.
We define the causal model M = (U,V,F ) as follows. The exogenous and endogenous
variables are defined by U = {A1, . . . ,An} and V = {A,D1, . . . ,Dk,B}, respectively,
where D(S) = {0,1} for all S ∈ U ∪ V . The functions F = {FS | S ∈ V } are defined as
follows:
• FA = 1,
• FD1 = φ1,
• FDi =Di−1 ∨ φi for all i ∈ {2, . . . , k},
• FB =Dk ∨A.
Note that the corresponding causal graph is shown in Fig. 4. We defineX,Y,Z ⊆ V byX =
{A}, Y = {D1, . . . ,Dk,B}, and Z = ∅. We write Y 1, . . . , Y k+1 to denote D1, . . . ,Dk,B .
The values 0 and 1 of X are denoted by x0 and x1, respectively. Observe that (1)–(3)
and (4b) are satisfied. It can now be shown that X is causally irrelevant to Y given Z iff φ
is a tautology (see Appendix A). ✷
The following result shows that deciding the notions of cause and cause in a context is
NP-complete. Here, it is easy to see that these problems can be solved by guessing some
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Fig. 4. Causal graph for co-NP-hardness of causal irrelevance for (1)–(3) and (4b).
x, x ′ ∈ D(X) and u ∈ D(U), and checking that Yx(u) = Yx ′(u) and Yxz(u) = Yx ′z(u),
respectively, in polynomial time. Hardness for NP is shown by a reduction from the
NP-complete problem of deciding whether a propositional formula in 3DNF is not a
tautology, using a construction similar to the one illustrated in Fig. 4.
Theorem 3.3. (a) Given a causal model M = (U,V,F ) and X,Y ⊆ V such that X,Y = ∅,
deciding whetherX is a cause of Y is NP-complete. Hardness holds even if (1) M is binary
and bounded, and (2) X,Y are singletons.
(b) Given a causal model M = (U,V,F ), X,Y,Z ⊆ V such that X,Y = ∅, and
z ∈ D(Z), deciding whether X is a cause of Y in the context Z = z is NP-complete.
Hardness holds even if (1) M is binary and bounded, and (2) X,Y are singletons.
The next theorem shows that deciding direct and indirect cause is NP- and DP-complete,
respectively. Here, the NP-completeness result is shown similarly as in the proof of
Theorem 3.3. The DP-membership result follows easily from (a) and Theorem 3.3(a), and
the DP-hardness result is shown by a reduction from the following DP-complete problem.
Given two propositional formulas in 3DNF α and β , decide whether α is a tautology
and β is not a tautology. Roughly speaking, the construction is a combination of the two
constructions shown in Figs. 3 and 4.
Theorem 3.4. (a) Given a causal model M = (U,V,F ) and X,Y ⊆ V such that X,Y = ∅,
deciding whether X is a direct cause of Y is NP-complete. Hardness holds even if (1) M
is binary and bounded, (2) X is a singleton, and (3) V =X ∪ Y .
(b) Given a causal model M = (U,V,F ) and X,Y ⊆ V such that X,Y = ∅, deciding
whetherX is an indirect cause of Y is DP-complete. Hardness holds even if (1)M is binary
and bounded, and (2) X is a singleton.
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4. Event causality
In this section, we analyze the complexity of deciding causal relationships between
events. In particular, we consider the notions of necessary and possible cause due to Galles
and Pearl [10], see also [32,33], and the notions of weak and actual cause by Halpern and
Pearl [17–19], which are inspired by Pearl’s causal beams [33].
4.1. Definitions
We now recall the notions of necessary and possible cause from [10] and the notions
of weak and actual cause from [17–19]. We first define events and the truth of events in a
causal model M = (U,V,F ) under a context u ∈D(U).
A primitive event is an expression of the form Y = y , where Y is an endogenous variable
and y is a value for Y . The set of events is the closure of the set of primitive events under
the Boolean operators ¬ and ∧ (that is, every primitive event is an event, and if φ and ψ
are events, then also ¬φ and φ ∧ψ).
The truth of an event φ in a causal model M = (U,V,F ) under a context u ∈D(U),
denoted (M,u) |= φ, is inductively defined as follows:
• (M,u) |= Y = y iff YM(u)= y ,
• (M,u) |= ¬φ iff (M,u) |= φ does not hold,
• (M,u) |= φ ∧ψ iff (M,u) |= φ and (M,u) |=ψ .
Further operators ∨ and → are defined as usual, i.e., φ ∨ ψ and φ → ψ stand for
¬(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ) and ¬φ ∨ ψ , respectively. We write φ(u) to abbreviate (M,u) |= φ. For
X ⊆ V and x ∈D(X), we use φx(u) to abbreviate (Mx,u) |= φ. For X = {X1, . . . ,Xk} ⊆
V with k  1 and xi ∈D(Xi), we use X = x1 · · ·xk to abbreviateX1 = x1∧· · · ∧Xk = xk .
The following result follows immediately from Proposition 2.3.
Proposition 4.1. Let X ⊆ V . Given u ∈ D(U), x ∈ D(X), and an event φ, deciding
whether φ(u) and φx(u) hold can be done in polynomial time.
We are now ready to define the notions of necessary and possible cause (which are
slightly more general than in [10]). Let M = (U,V,F ) be a causal model, and let X ⊆ V
and x ∈D(X). Let φ be an event. Then,
• X = x always causes φ, or X = x is a necessary cause of φ, if (i) φx(u) for all
u ∈D(U), and (ii) some values x ′ ∈D(X) and u′ ∈D(U) exist such that x ′ = x and
¬φx ′(u′).
• X = x may have caused φ, or X = x is a possible cause of φ, if (i) X = x and φ are
observed (which implies that X(u)= x and φ(u) for some u ∈D(U)), and (ii) some
values x ′ ∈D(X) and u ∈D(U) exist such that x ′ = x , X(u)= x , φ(u), and ¬φx ′(u).
We next recall the notions of weak and actual cause from [17–19]. We say X = x is a
weak cause of φ under u, if the following conditions hold:
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AC1. X(u)= x and φ(u).
AC2. Some set of endogenous variables W ⊆ V \ X and some values x ∈ D(X) and
w ∈D(W) exist such that:
(a) ¬φxw(u),
(b) φxwz(u) for all Z ⊆ V \ (X ∪W) and z=Z(u).
We say X = x is an actual cause of φ under u, if additionally the following minimality
condition is satisfied:
AC3. X is minimal with AC1 and AC2. That is, for every X′ ⊂X, it holds that X′ = x|X′
is not a weak cause of φ under u.
The following example illustrates these causal relationships.
Example 4.2 (arsonists continued). In our running example, A1 = 1, A2 = 1, and A1 =
1∧A2 = 1 always cause B = 1. For instance, let us show thatA1 = 1 always causes B = 1:
(i) if A1 is set to 1, then B has the value 1 under every u ∈D(U), and (ii) if U2 is set to 0,
and A1 to 0, then B has the value 0. Informally, at least one arsonist starting a fire always
has the effect that the whole forest burns down.
Consider now the context u= (1,1) in which both arsonists intend to start a fire. Then,
A1 = 1, A2 = 1, and A1 = 1∧A2 = 1 are weak causes of B = 1. For instance, let us show
that A1 = 1 is a weak cause of B = 1: (AC1) both A1 and B is 1 under u, (AC2(a)) if both
A1 and A2 are set to 0, then B has the value 0, and (AC2(b)) if A1 is set to 1 and A2 to 0,
then B is 1. In fact, A1 = 1 and A2 = 1 are actual causes of B = 1, while A1 = 1∧A2 = 1
is not an actual cause of B = 1.
4.2. Results
Our complexity results for the above causal relationships between events are summa-
rized in Table 2. We distinguish between the general and the binary case, where we assume
a syntactic restriction to binary causal models. In detail, in both the general and the bi-
nary case, deciding necessary cause is DP-complete, while deciding possible cause is only
NP-complete. Roughly, necessary cause is the conjunction of a universal quantification and
an existential one, while possible cause involves only an existential quantification. Further-
more, deciding weak and actual cause is P2 -complete in the general case and NP-complete
in the binary case. Roughly, weak and actual causes involve an existential quantification
Table 2
Complexity of event causality
Problem General case Binary case
X= x always causes φ DP-complete DP-complete
X= x may cause φ NP-complete NP-complete
X= x is a weak cause of φ P2 -complete NP-complete
X= x is an actual cause of φ P2 -complete NP-complete
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followed by a universal one, where the latter can be removed in the binary case. Moreover,
actual causes are shown to be always primitive, and thus can be identified in constant time
among the weak causes. We remark that for all these causal relationships between events,
hardness holds even if M is bounded and X is a singleton.
The following result shows that deciding necessary and possible cause is complete for
DP and NP, respectively. Here, membership is easily proved using Propositions 2.3 and 4.1.
The NP-hardness result is proved as in the proof of Theorem 3.3, while the DP-hardness
result is shown by a reduction from deciding, given two propositional formulas in 3DNF α
and β , whether α is a tautology and β is not a tautology. Roughly, the construction suitably
combines two instances of the construction in Fig. 3.
Theorem 4.3. (a) Given a causal model M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , x ∈ D(X), and an
event φ, deciding whether X = x always causes φ is DP-complete. Hardness holds even if
M is binary and bounded, and X is a singleton.
(b) Given a causal model M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , x ∈D(X), and an event ψ , deciding
whether X = x may have caused ψ is NP-complete. Hardness holds even if M is binary
and bounded, X is a singleton, and ψ is primitive.
The next theorem shows that deciding weak cause is P2 -complete in the general case.
We sketch the main ideas behind its proof, which is technically quite involved.
Theorem 4.4. Given M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , x ∈ D(X), u ∈ D(U), and an event φ,
deciding whether X = x is a weak cause of φ under u is P2 -complete. Hardness holds
even if X is a singleton, |D(S)|  3 for all S ∈ U ∪ V , and either M is bounded or φ is
primitive.
Proof. As for membership in P2 , recall that X = x is a weak cause of φ under u iff AC1
and AC2 hold. By Propositions 2.3 and 4.1, in AC1, deciding whether X(u)= x and φ(u)
hold is polynomial. Moreover, in AC2, some W , x, and w as required can be guessed and
verified in polynomial time with an NP-oracle (needed for (b)). In summary, checking AC1
and AC2 is in P2 .
Hardness for P2 is shown by a polynomial transformation from the following standard
P2 -complete problem [31]. Given a quantified Boolean formula Φ = ∃A∀Bγ , where γ is
a propositional formula on the variables A= {A1, . . . ,Am} and B = {B1, . . . ,Bn}, decide
whether Φ is true.
We now define M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , x ∈ D(X), u ∈ D(U), and φ as stated such
that X = x is a weak cause of φ under u iff Φ is true.
We define the causal model M = (U,V,F ) as follows. The exogenous and endogenous
variables are U = {E} and V = A ∪ B ∪ {C,G,H }, respectively, where D(S) = {0,1,2}
for all S ∈B , and D(S)= {0,1} for all S ∈U ∪ V \B . We define
φ′ =
(
γ ′ ∧
∧
S∈B
S = 2
)
∨ (C = 0)∨
(
G= 1∧C = 1∧
∨
S∈B
S = 2
)
,
where γ ′ is obtained from γ by replacing each S ∈ A ∪ B by “S = 1”. The functions
F = {FS | S ∈ V } are then defined as follows:
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Fig. 5. Causal graph for P2 -hardness of weak cause.
• FS = 0 for all S ∈A∪ {C,G},
• FS =G+C for all S ∈ B ,
• FH = 1 iff φ′ is true.
We define X = {G} and Y = {H }. Let u ∈D(U) and x = 0, and let φ be Y = 1.
It can now be shown that X = x is a weak cause of φ under u iff Φ is true. More
precisely, AC1 is trivially satisfied, and AC2 holds iff Φ is true (see Appendix B).
Roughly speaking, the existential and universal quantification over A and B in Φ is
expressed by the existential quantification over W ⊆ V \ X and w ∈ D(W) in AC2 and
the universal quantification over Z ⊆ V \ (X ∪W) in AC2(b), respectively. Here, every
Z ⊆ B corresponds to a truth assignment to the variables in B . We then especially have to
ensure that (i) W ∩B = ∅ and (ii) no truth assignment to the variables in B is ignored. In
detail, to make φ false in AC2(a), C must be set to 1 and all S ∈ B must have the value 2.
Whereas, to make φ true in AC2(b), all S ∈ B must have a value from {0,1}. This already
ensures (i). Since G is set to 0 in AC2(b), and FS = G + C for all S ∈ B , each variable
in B has the value 1 in AC2(b). As every S ∈ B has the value 0 in M , this then ensures (ii).
Observe that X is a singleton, |D(S)| 3 for all S ∈U ∪V , and φ is primitive. To show
P2 -hardness for the case that X is a singleton, |D(S)|  3 for all S ∈ U ∪ V , and M is
bounded, define M ′ = (U,V \ {H },F \ {FH }). Then, X = x is a weak cause of φ′ under u
in M ′ iff Φ is true. ✷
The just sketched proof of P2 -hardness makes use of non-binary causal models. Thus,
we may ask whether deciding weak cause in the binary case has a lower complexity.
Indeed, the following semantic result shows that in the binary case, AC2 can be expressed
in a different way, and the new characterization then implies that deciding weak cause is in
NP in the binary case.
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Theorem 4.5. Let M = (U,V,F ) be binary, let X ⊆ V and x ∈ D(X), and let φ be an
event. Then,X = x is a weak cause of φ under u∈D(U) iff AC1 and the following condition
AC2′ hold:
AC2′. Some set of endogenous variables W ⊆ V \ X and some values x ∈ D(X) and
w ∈D(W) exist such that:
(a) ¬φxw(u),
(b) φxw(u),
(c) Zxw(u)=Z(u) for Z = V \ (X ∪W).
Proof. Notice that AC2′(a) is identical to AC2(a). Moreover, AC2′(b) can be replaced
by AC2(b), as AC2′(c) implies that setting Z ⊆ V \ (X ∪W) to z = Z(u) is immaterial
in φxwz(u) of AC2(b). Thus, it is now sufficient to show that for binary M , we can add
AC2′(c) to AC2(a) and (b).
Roughly speaking, we can additionally satisfy AC2′(c) by iteratively moving variables
from V \ (X ∪W) to the W -part in AC2(a) and (b) (see Appendix B). More precisely, any
singleton S ∈ V \(X∪W) with Sxw(u) = S(u) can be moved to theW -part assigning them
Sxw(u). This is always feasible for Sxw(u) = Sxw(u). If M is binary, this is also feasible
for Sxw(u) = Sxw(u), which then implies Sxw(u) = S(u). This construction can now be
iterated until AC2′(c) holds. ✷
Based on this result, it can now be shown that deciding weak cause in the binary case is
NP-complete. More formally, this is expressed by the following theorem.
Theorem 4.6. Given a binary M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , x ∈ D(X), u ∈ D(U), and an
event φ, deciding whether X = x is a weak cause of φ under u is NP-complete. Hardness
holds even if M is bounded, X is a singleton, and φ is primitive.
We next focus on the problem of deciding actual cause. We first prove the follow-
ing Splitting Theorem, which says that if X = x is a weak cause of an event φ under a
context u, then for any splitting of X = x into two events X0 = x0 and X1 = x1, at least
one among X0 = x0 and X1 = x1 is another weak cause of φ under u.
Theorem 4.7 (Splitting Theorem). Let M=(U,V,F ) be a causal model, let X⊆V and
x ∈D(X), and let φ be an event. Let {X0,X1} be a partition of X (that is, X0,X1 = ∅,
X0 ∪X1 = X, and X0 ∩X1 = ∅), and let x0 = x|X0 and x1 = x|X1. If X = x is a weak
cause of φ under u, then either (1) X0 = x0 is a weak cause of φ under u, or (2) X1 = x1
is a weak cause of φ under u.
Proof. Let X = x be a weak cause of φ under u. That is, AC1–AC2 hold. In particular,
in AC2, some set of variables W ⊆ V \ X and some values x ∈ D(X) and w ∈ D(W)
exist such that (a) ¬φxw(u), and (b) φxwz(u) for all Z ⊆ V \ (X ∪W) and z= Z(u). Let
x0 = x|X0 and x1 = x|X1. We now consider two cases:
(1) Assume that φx0x1wz(u) for all Z ⊆ V \ (X ∪W) and z=Z(u). Informally, we can
then move the variables in X1 to the W -part of AC2 assigning them x1. That is, we have
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(a) ¬φx′w′(u), and (b) φx ′w′z(u) for all Z ⊆ V \ (X′ ∪W ′) and z=Z(u), where X′ =X0,
W ′ = X1 ∪W , x ′ = x0, x′ = x0, and w′ = x1w. That is, X′ = x ′ is a weak cause of φ
under u. That is, X0 = x0 is a weak cause of φ under u.
(2) Assume that ¬φx0x1wz(u) for some Z ⊆ V \ (X ∪W) and z=Z(u). Informally, we
can then move the variables in X0 and Z to the W -part of AC2 assigning them x0 and z,
respectively. That is, we have (a) ¬φx′w′(u), and (b) φx ′w′z′(u) for all Z′ ⊆ V \ (X′ ∪W ′)
and z′ =Z′(u), where X′ =X1, W ′ =X0∪W ∪Z, x ′ = x1, x ′ = x1, and w′ = x0wz (note
that each instance of AC2(b) for X′ = x ′ is an instance of AC2(b) for X = x). That is,
X′ = x ′ is a weak cause of φ under u. That is, X1 = x1 is a weak cause of φ under u. ✷
Example 4.8 (arsonists continued). In our running example, only from the fact that
A1 = 1∧A2 = 1 is a weak cause of B = 1, we know by the Splitting Theorem that either
A1 = 1 is a weak cause of B = 1, or that A2 = 1 is a weak cause of B = 1.
As a corollary, it follows that every actual cause is primitive, as otherwise it would
contain a smaller weak cause and thus violate the minimality condition AC3. This proves
an open conjecture by Halpern and Pearl [17], which has been proved independently by
Hopkins [20], with a more involved argumentation. Note that the following corollary also
holds for the setting of possibly infinite domains and sets of endogenous variables in [17].
Corollary 4.9 (conjecture by Halpern and Pearl [17]). Let M = (U,V,F ) be a causal
model, let X ⊆ V and x ∈D(X), and let φ be an event. If X = x is an actual cause of φ
under u, then X is a singleton.
This shows that X = x is an actual cause of φ under u iff (i) X = x is a weak cause of φ
under u, and (ii) X = x is primitive. As a corollary of Theorem 4.4 and Corollary 4.9, it
thus follows that deciding whether X = x is an actual cause of φ under u is P2 -complete
in the general case.
Corollary 4.10. Given M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , x∈D(X), u∈D(U), and an event φ,
deciding whether X = x is an actual cause of φ under u is P2 -complete. Hardness holds
even if X is a singleton, |D(S)|  3 for all S ∈ U ∪ V , and either M is bounded or φ is
primitive.
Moreover, as a corollary of Theorem 4.6 and Corollary 4.9, deciding whether X = x is
an actual cause of φ under u is NP-complete in the binary case.
Corollary 4.11. Given a binary M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , x ∈ D(X), u ∈ D(U), and an
event φ, deciding whetherX = x is an actual cause of φ under u is NP-complete. Hardness
holds even if M is bounded, X is a singleton, and φ is primitive.
5. Probabilistic causality
In this section, we analyze the computational complexity of probabilistic causal rela-
tionships. In detail, we consider the problem of deciding probabilistic causal irrelevance,
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and some decision and function computation problems involving counterfactual formulas.
These problems are due to Galles and Pearl [10]; see also [32,33].
5.1. Definitions
We now recall causal formulas from [16], which generalize the counterfactual formulas
in [10,32,33], and we define their probability in probabilistic causal models. We then recall
the notions of probabilistic causal irrelevance, of likely causes of events, and of occurrences
of events despite other events from [10].
A basic causal formula is an expression [X1 ← x1, . . . ,Xk ← xk]φ, where φ is an
event, X1, . . . ,Xk are pairwise distinct endogenous variables, xi ∈ D(Xi) for all i ∈
{1, . . . , k}, and k  0. The set of causal formulas is the closure of the set of basic causal
formulas under the Boolean operators ¬ and ∧. For X = {X1, . . . ,Xk} and x = x1 . . . xk ,
we use [X ← x]φ to abbreviate [X1 ← x1, . . . ,Xk ← xk]φ. We then use Yx = y to
abbreviate [X ← x]Y = y . Note that such formulas Yx = y are called counterfactual
formulas in [10,32,33].
The truth of a causal formula ψ in a causal model M = (U,V,F ) under u ∈ D(U),
denoted (M,u) |=ψ , is inductively defined as follows:
• (M,u) |= [X← x]φ iff φx(u) in M ,
• (M,u) |= ¬φ iff (M,u) |= φ does not hold,
• (M,u) |= φ ∧ψ iff (M,u) |= φ and (M,u) |=ψ .
Further connectives ∨ and → for causal formulas are defined as usual, i.e., φ ∨ ψ and
φ→ ψ stand for¬(¬φ∧¬ψ) and¬φ∨ψ , respectively. The following result is immediate
by Proposition 4.1.
Proposition 5.1. Given a context u ∈ D(U) and a causal formula ψ , deciding whether
(M,u) |=ψ holds can be done in polynomial time.
The probability of a causal formula ψ in a probabilistic causal model (M,P),
where M = (U,V,F ), denoted P(ψ), is defined as follows:
P(ψ)=
∑
u∈D(U), (M,u)|=ψ
P(u).
For causal formulas φ,ψ with P(φ) > 0, the conditional probability of ψ given φ,
denoted P(ψ | φ), is defined as P(ψ ∧ φ)/P(φ). Thus, if φ is true in all contexts, then
P(ψ | φ)= P(ψ).
We remark that our probabilities of causal formulas generalize the probabilities
of conjunctions of counterfactual formulas Yx = y and events Y = y in [10,32,33].
Furthermore, our conditional probabilities over causal formulas are a generalization of
the probabilities of counterfactual queries as described in [1,32,33].
Example 5.2 (arsonists continued). Let (M,P ) be the probabilistic causal model of our
running example. Then, P([A1 = 0]B = 1 | A1 = 1 ∧ A2 = 0) represents the probability
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that the forest would have burned down, if arsonist 1 did not start a fire, given that in the
real world arsonist 1 started a fire and arsonist 2 did not.
We are now ready to define the concepts of probabilistic causal irrelevance, of likely
causes of events, and of occurrences of events despite other events.
• For X,Y,Z ⊆ V with X,Y = ∅, we say X is probabilistically causally irrelevant to Y
given Z, denoted (X Y | Z)P, if P(Yxz = y)= P(Yx ′z = y) for all x, x ′ ∈D(X), y ∈
D(Y), and z ∈D(Z). Intuitively, once the value of Z is fixed at z, changingX between
any two values will not change the probability of Y .
• For X ⊆ V , x ∈D(X), an event φ, and α ∈ [0,1], we say X = x is a likely cause of φ
with goodness α, if (i) φ is observed (which implies that φ(u) for some u ∈ D(U)),
and (ii) P([X←x]φ ∧ [X←x ′]¬φ | φ) α for some x ′ ∈D(X)\{x}.
• For X ⊆ V , x ∈D(X), an event φ, and α ∈ [0,1], we say φ occurred despite X = x
with goodness α, if (i) φ and X = x are observed (which implies that φ(u) and
X(u)= x for some u ∈D(U)), and (ii) P([X← x]φ) 1− α.
Note that the last two definitions are slightly more general than in [10,32,33], as φ can be
any event here and is not restricted to only primitive events.
Example 5.3 (arsonists continued). Let M = (U,V,F ) be the causal model defined in
Example 2.1, and let P be the uniform distribution over D(U). Denote by a1 (respectively,
a1) the value 1 (respectively, 0) of A1. Then, A1 is not probabilistically causally irrelevant
to B , as P(Ba1 = 1)= 1 = 0.5= P(Ba1 = 1). Informally, the actions of arsonist 1 are not
probabilistically causally irrelevant to the state of the forest.
Consider now the probability function P on D(U) that is given by P(u1,1) = 0.1,
P(u1,0) = 0.7, P(u0,1) = 0.1, and P(u0,0) = 0.1, where the contexts ui,j ∈ D(U) are
defined by ui,j (U1)= i and ui,j (U2)= j for all i, j ∈ {0,1}. Assume that the event B = 1
is observed. Then, A1 = 1 is a likely cause of B = 1 with goodness 7/9, as P(Ba1 =
1 ∧ Ba1 = 0 | B = 1)  7/9. Furthermore, suppose next that the two events B = 1
and A1 = 0 are observed. Then, B = 1 occurred despite A1 = 0 with goodness 0.8, as
P(Ba1 = 1)= 0.2 1− 0.8.
5.2. Results
In addition to the probabilistic causality notions in [10,32,33] that we introduced in the
previous subsection, we also analyze the complexity of deciding whether the probability
of a causal formula is at least α, and whether the conditional probability of a causal
formula given a causal formula is at least α. We also analyze the complexity of computing
the probability of a causal formula. Our complexity results are summarized in Table 3.
In detail, deciding probabilistic causal irrelevance is C=-complete and computing the
probability of a causal formula is #P-complete, while the other four problems are all
C-complete. We remark that for all these six problems, hardness holds even if M is binary
and bounded, and P is the uniform distribution. Furthermore, we would obtain similar
results for causal formulas if “at least” is replaced by “at most”.
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Table 3
Complexity of probabilistic causality
Problem Complexity
X is probabilistically causally irrelevant to Y given Z C=-complete
X= x is a likely cause of φ with goodness α C-complete
φ occurred despite X= x with goodness α C-complete
probability of a causal formula is at least α C-complete
conditional probability over two causal formulas is at least α C-complete
probability of a causal formula #P-complete
The above results are nontrivial and need some explanations. Firstly, the problems of
testing likely causes of events, occurrences of events despite other events, whether the
probability of a causal formula is at least α, and whether the conditional probability over
two causal formulas is at least α are harder than co-NP, and thus not polynomially reducible
to SAT-testing. Moreover, these problems cannot be reduced to any solver for problems that
are located in the Polynomial Hierarchy. On the other hand, they are solvable in polynomial
space, and thus reducible to a QBF solver (e.g., [4,9,34]) in polynomial time. Furthermore,
testing probabilistic causal irrelevance is “easier” than C-complete problems, which could
perhaps help in finding polynomial time (randomized) approximation algorithms for this
problem.
We remark that for computing the conditional probability P(ψ | φ) over two causal
formulas, our result on computing P(φ) for a single causal formula φ implies that this
problem can be described as the ratio f1/f2 of two #P-computable functions f1 and f2,
respectively. However, a normalized representation, similar as the one that we have chosen
for elementary probabilities in Assumption (3) of Section 2.2, seems not straightforward,
and so is a representation of P(ψ | φ) in #P. We can, however, polynomially reduce the
problem (in the sense for functions, see, e.g., [31]) to a function g in #P, such that the
desired P(ψ | φ) is easily read off from the value of g(I) at the original problem input I .
The following theorem shows that deciding probabilistic causal irrelevance is complete
for C= . Here, the membership part is proved by a reduction to an exponential number of
instances of the C=-complete problem EQUALRUN: Given two NP Turing machines T1
and T2 and an input string w, decide whether T1 and T2 have the same number of
accepting runs on w. This locates the problem in the complexity class ∀C=, which is a
generalization of C= similar to  P2 for co-NP [37]: A problem P is in ∀C=, if there
exists a problem P ′ in C= such that I is a Yes-instance of P iff for every string J of
size polynomial in the size of I , it holds that I, J is a Yes-instance of P ′. Thus, deciding
probabilistic causal irrelevance is in the class ∀C=, which somewhat surprisingly coincides
with C=. The hardness part is shown by a reduction from the C=-complete problem
HALFSAT.
Theorem 5.4. Given a probabilistic causal model (M,P), where M = (U,V,F ), and
X,Y,Z ⊆ V with X,Y = ∅, deciding whether (X Y |Z)P is complete for C=. Hardness
holds even if M is binary and bounded, Z is empty, X,Y are singletons, and P is the
uniform distribution.
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Proof. We first show membership in C=. Recall that (X Y |Z)P holds iff P(Yxz = y)=
P(Yx ′z = y) for all values x ′, x, y , and z. We now show that deciding whether P(Yxz =
y)= P(Yx ′z = y) holds, for given x, x ′, y , and z, can be transformed in polynomial time to
the following problem EQUALRUN, which is in C= by Lemma 5.5: Given two NP Turing
machines T1 and T2 and an input string w, decide whether T1 and T2 have the same number
of accepting runs on w.
Lemma 5.5 (cf. [15,30]). EQUALRUN is in C= .
Let P be given by (f, b) as described in Section 2.2. Let T1 and T2 be NP Turing
machines which on input x, y, z and on input x ′, y, z, respectively, nondeterministically
select an u ∈D(U) and generate f (u) paths. On each of these paths, T1 (respectively, T2)
computes deterministically Yxz(u) (respectively, Yx ′z(u)), and accepts if this value
coincides with y , otherwise it rejects. Then, P(Yxz = y)= P(Yx ′z = y) iff T1 and T2 have
the same numbers of accepting paths.
Obviously, T1 and T2 can be constructed in polynomial time from M and x, x ′, y, z.
However, we actually need to test that P(Yxz = y) = P(Yx ′z = y) for all values x ′, x, y ,
and z. What we obtain is that the problem is in the class ∀C=. However, the following
nontrivial result is known:
Lemma 5.6 (cf. [15,30]). ∀C= =C=, that is, the classes coincide.
Thus, our reduction in fact proves membership in C=.
Hardness for C= is shown by a reduction from HALFSAT: Given a Boolean formula φ
on the atoms A1, . . . ,An with n 1, decide whether exactly half of the truth assignments
to A1, . . . ,An satisfy φ. The following lemma shows that HALFSAT is C=-complete (see
Appendix C); note that hardness holds even if φ is a CNF or DNF.
Lemma 5.7. HALFSAT is complete for C=.
We now construct a probabilistic causal model (M,P), where M = (U,V,F ), and
X,Y,Z ⊆ V with X,Y = ∅, such that (X Y | Z)P iff exactly 2n−1 truth assignments
to A1, . . . ,An satisfy φ. The construction is based on similar ideas as the construction
shown in Fig. 4, but more involved.
We define M as follows. The exogenous and endogenous variables are defined by
U = {A1, . . . ,An} and V = {A,B} ∪ {Dα | α is a subformula of φ}, respectively, where
D(S)= {0,1} for all S ∈ U ∪ V . The functions F = {FS | S ∈ V } are defined as follows:
• FDAi =Ai for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n},• FDα =¬Dβ for every subformula of φ of the form α =¬β ,
• FDα =Dβ ∧Dγ for every subformula of φ of the form α = β ∧ γ ,
• FA = 1,
• FB =Dφ ≡A.
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We define P(u) = 2−n for all u ∈ D(U). We define X = {A}, Y = {B}, and Z = ∅. The
values 0 and 1 of X are denoted by x0 and x1, respectively. We now show that (X Y |
Z)P iff exactly 2n−1 truth assignments to A1, . . . ,An satisfy φ.
Denote by m1 (respectively, m0) the number of truth assignments in which φ is true
(respectively, false). For every u ∈ D(U), it holds that Yx0(u) = 1 iff φ is false under u,
and that Yx1(u) = 1 iff φ is true under u. It thus follows P(Yx0 = 1) = m0 · 2−n and
P(Yx1 = 1)=m1 ·2−n. Moreover, for every u ∈D(U), it holds that Yx0(u)= 0 iff φ is true
under u, and that Yx1(u)= 0 iff φ is false under u. Hence, it follows P(Yx0 = 0)=m1 ·2−n
and P(Yx1 = 0) = m0 · 2−n. In summary, this shows that P(Yx = y) = P(Yx ′ = y) for all
x, x ′ ∈D(X) and y ∈D(Y) iff m0 =m1. That is, (X Y |Z)P iff φ is satisfied by exactly
2n−1 truth assignments.
Notice that M is binary and bounded, Z is empty, X,Y are singletons, and P is the
uniform distribution. Thus, hardness holds even in this restricted setting. ✷
The next theorem shows that deciding whether the probability of a causal formula is at
least α is complete for C. Here, the membership result is shown by a reduction to deciding
whether an NP Turing machine has at least m accepting runs. The hardness result is proved
by a reduction from GE-HALFSAT.
Theorem 5.8. Given a probabilistic causal model (M,P), where M = (U,V,F ), a causal
formula ψ , and α  0, deciding whether P(ψ) α is C-complete. Hardness holds even if
M is binary and bounded, P is the uniform distribution, ψ is a counterfactual formula of
the form Yx = y with singletons X,Y , and α = 0.5.
Proof. We first show membership in C. Let P be given by (f, b) as described in
Section 2.2. Let the NP Turing machine T have input ψ and nondeterministically generate
all u ∈D(U). Then, for each u, let T generate f (u) paths, and decide whether (M,u) |=ψ
holds, which can be done in polynomial time by Proposition 5.1. On each of these paths, T
accepts if (M,u) |=ψ , otherwise it rejects. Then, P(ψ) α iff T has at least α ·b accepting
paths.
C-Hardness is shown by a reduction from GE-HALFSAT: Given a Boolean formula φ
on the atoms A1, . . . ,An with n 1, decide whether at least half of the truth assignments
to A1, . . . ,An satisfy φ. By the following lemma, GE-HALFSAT is C-complete (see
Appendix C); hardness holds even if φ is a CNF or DNF.
Lemma 5.9. GE-HALFSAT is complete for C.
We define the causal model M = (U,V,F ), the probability distribution P, and the sets
of variables X,Y ⊆ V as in the proof of Theorem 5.4. Denote by x1 the value 1 of X,
and define ψ as Yx1 = 1. Observe that M is binary and bounded, ψ is a counterfactual
formula of the form Yx = y , where X,Y are singletons, and P is the uniform distribution.
As argued in the proof of Theorem 5.4, for every u ∈ D(U), it holds that Yx1(u) = 1 iff
φ is true under u. Hence, P(ψ) = P(Yx1 = 1)=m · 2−n, where m is the number of truth
assignments that satisfy φ. Thus, P(ψ)  0.5 iff at least half of the truth assignments to
A1, . . . ,An satisfy φ. ✷
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The next theorem shows that also deciding occurrences of events despite other events is
complete for C. Here, membership follows from Theorem 5.8, using that NP is contained
in C, and that C is closed under polynomial-time conjunctive reductions [3]. Hardness is
proved similarly as in the proof of Theorem 5.8.
Theorem 5.10. Given a probabilistic causal model (M,P), where M = (U,V,F ), X⊆ V ,
x ∈D(X), an event ψ , and α ∈ [0,1], deciding whether ψ occurred despite X = x with
goodness α is C-complete. Hardness holds even if M is binary and bounded, P is the
uniform distribution, X is a singleton, ψ is primitive, and α = 0.5.
The following result states a C-completeness result similar to Theorem 5.8 for
conditional probabilities P(ψ | φ) over causal formulas. However, we assume here that α is
rational. Since probabilities P(ψ) over causal formulas amount to a special case, hardness
is immediate by Theorem 5.8.
Theorem 5.11. Given a probabilistic causal model (M,P), where M = (U,V,F ), causal
formulas φ andψ , and a rational number α ∈ [0,1], deciding whether P(ψ ∧ φ) α · P(φ)
is C-complete. Hardness holds even if M is binary and bounded, P is the uniform distribu-
tion, ψ is a counterfactual formula Yx = y with singletons X and Y , φ =, and α = 0.5.
Proof. We first show membership in C. Let P be given by (f, b) as described in
Section 2.2. From standard representations of α, we can easily obtain integers t > 0 and
s ∈ [0, t] such that α = s/t if α is not given in this format anyway (e.g., if α is given in
point decimal notation). Let the NP Turing machines T1 and T2 be constructed as in the
proof of Theorem 5.8 such that they have exactly b · P(ψ ∧ φ) and b · P(φ) accepting
runs, respectively. Let the NP Turing machine T1′ (respectively, T2′) be obtained from T1
(respectively, T2) by nondeterministically generating t (respectively, s) paths for each
run r of T1 (respectively, T2) that corresponds to some u ∈ D(U) with f (u) > 0, where
each new run in T1′ (respectively, T2′) accepts iff its old run r in T1 (respectively, T2)
accepts. Thus, the number of accepting runs of T1′ (respectively, T2′) is t · b · P(ψ ∧ φ)
(respectively, s · b ·P(φ)). Let the NP Turing machine T2′′ be obtained from T2′ by turning
each accepting run into a non-accepting one, and vice versa, and by then adding (t − s) · b
accepting runs. Observe now that T1′ and T2′′ have the same number m of runs. Then, T2′′
has m− s · b ·P(φ) accepting runs. Let the NP Turing machine T be obtained from T1′ and
T2
′′ by nondeterministically entering either a run of T1′ or a run of T2′′. Then, half of the
runs of T are accepting iff
m− s · b · P(φ)+ t · b · P(ψ ∧ φ)m,
that is, P(ψ ∧ φ) α · P(φ).
Hardness for C is immediate by Theorem 5.8. ✷
The following theorem shows that deciding likely causes of events is C-complete. The
membership part follows from Theorem 5.11, using that NP is contained in C, and that C
is closed under polynomial-time conjunctive and disjunctive reductions [3]. The hardness
part is proved similarly as in the proof of Theorem 5.8.
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Theorem 5.12. Given a probabilistic causal model (M,P), where M = (U,V,F ), X⊆ V ,
x ∈D(X), an eventψ , and a rational number α ∈ [0,1], deciding whetherX = x is a likely
cause of ψ with goodness α is complete for C. Hardness holds even if M is binary and
bounded, P is the uniform distribution, X is a singleton, ψ is primitive, and α = 0.5.
We remark that for the result in the previous theorem, Assumption (2) in Section 2.2
about model representation, i.e., that domains are enumerated, is relevant. In fact, under
implicit domain representation, the complexity of this problem increases to the class ∃C
in the Counting Hierarchy, which coincides with the class NPPP, i.e., nondeterministic
polynomial time with an oracle for problems in PP [37] (see, e.g., [27] for other
occurrences of this complexity class in AI problems). We leave the proof of ∃C-
completeness, which can be obtained by minor adjustments of the proof of Theorem 5.11,
to the interested reader.
The following result shows that computing the probability of a causal formula is
complete for #P. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 5.8.
Theorem 5.13. Given a probabilistic causal model (M,P), where M = (U,V,F ) and P
is given by (f, b) as described in Section 2.2, and a causal formula ψ , computing b ·P(ψ)
is complete for #P. Hardness holds even if M is binary and bounded, P is the uniform
distribution, and ψ is a counterfactual formula of the form Yx = y with singletons X,Y .
Proof. We first show membership in #P. Let P be given by (f, b) as described in
Section 2.2. Let the NP Turing machine T be defined as in the proof of Theorem 5.8.
It then holds P(ψ)=m/b, where m is the number of accepting paths of T .
Hardness for #P is shown by a reduction from the following #P-complete problem #SAT.
Given a Boolean formula φ on the atoms A1, . . . ,An with n 1, compute the number of
truth assignments to A1, . . . ,An that satisfy φ.
We define the causal model M = (U,V,F ), the probability distribution P, and the
causal formula ψ as in the proof of Theorem 5.8. Let (f, b) = (1,2n). It then holds
P(ψ)=m · 2−n, where m is the number of truth assignments that satisfy φ. ✷
6. Discussion and conclusion
In this section, we summarize our results and discuss related work. We then describe
some applications of our results and give an outlook on future research.
6.1. Summary
In this paper, we have studied the computational complexity of causal relationships in
Pearl’s structural-model approach. We have considered several different such relationships
from [10,17–19,32,33], which can be classified into notions of causality between variables,
notions of event causality, and notions of probabilistic causality. In the course of our
analysis, we have also established some novel semantic results about weak and actual
causes as defined by Halpern and Pearl [17], and we have settled an open conjecture. The
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notions of causality between variables and of event causality are located in classes at the
low end of the Polynomial Hierarchy, and are with the exception of weak and actual causes
complete for NP or co-NP, or only mildly harder. The notions of probabilistic causality
are characterized by counting classes corresponding to NP, in particular, by C and C=. All
notions of causality that we have considered are intractable, where the more sophisticated
notions of weak and actual cause, and the notions of probabilistic causality have the highest
complexity (P2 and C, respectively).
The results for the simpler notions of event causality (“always causes” and “may cause”)
are similar to the results for causality between variables; this is intuitively explained by
the fact that all these notions reduce to (possibly combined) tests for the existence of
certain hypothetical scenarios (given by causal submodels), which can be guessed and
then checked in polynomial time. The more sophisticated notions of event causality (weak
and actual causality), however, have much more involved conditions, which request to
visit a (possibly exponential) number of further scenarios to prove that a guess for a
hypothetical scenario is suitable. Because of the complexity gap, we cannot efficiently
transform weak and actual causality to simpler notions of event and variable causality.
In other terms, weak and actual causality are more expressive, as they are capable of
representing harder problems. Compared to notions of probabilistic causality, weak and
actual causes have neither lower nor higher complexity, while all the other notions of event
and variable causality have lower complexity. Among the probabilistic causal relationships,
probabilistic irrelevance has the lowest complexity (C=-complete); even if intractable, it
may have its uses (see below).
6.2. Related work
To our knowledge, there is no previous work in the literature on the computational
complexity of causal relationships in the structural-model approach. The presented
complexity results on probabilistic causal relationships are in some sense related to
the complexity of probabilistic inference, in particular, in Bayesian networks and in
probabilistic logic. As for Bayesian networks, Cooper [5] has shown that deciding P(X =
x) > 0 is NP-complete, and by the results of Roth [35], deciding P(X = x) > α for a
rational number α is C-complete, while computing the exact probability P(X = x) is
#P-complete (assuming our representation). Note that by applying the techniques used
in this paper, we can easily derive that evaluating probabilistic conditional statements
P(X = x | Y = y)  α in Bayesian networks is C-complete. Only weakly related is
work on the complexity of maximum a posteriori explanations (MAPs) in Bayesian
networks [36], which are assignments to all variables extending given partial assignments
such that the probability is maximum. Computing a MAP may be viewed as a classical
constraint optimization problem over contexts, where no special relationships between
variables or contexts are of interest. This is quite different from the various notions of
causality that we have considered here. Other less related work concerns reasoning about
conditional probability statements in probabilistic logic. Here, the results by Fagin et al.
[8] imply that deciding whether P(ψ | φ) ∈ [α,β] for all models P of a finite set of
conditional probability statements is co-NP-complete, while Lukasiewicz [28] has shown
that computing the tightest interval [α,β] such that P(ψ | φ) ∈ [α,β] for all models P of
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a finite set of conditional probability statements is FPNP-complete, i.e., complete for the
class of functions computable in polynomial time with an NP oracle.
6.3. Applications of results
Our complexity results show that, similar to independencies [33], deterministic and
probabilistic causal relationships might be used to simplify the evaluation of probabilistic
counterfactuals [1], which are special causal formulas: Besides the simple form P(Yx = y),
a more involved form is P(Zx ′ = z | X = x ∧ Y = y), which reads “if X is x and Y is y
in the real world, and if X were x ′, what is then the probability that Z is z?”. By our
results, this seems reasonable, as the complexity of testing simple causal relationships (at
most DP, C=) is much lower than the complexity of evaluating probabilistic counterfactuals
(#P-hardness). Furthermore, tests with complexity at most DP can be polynomially reduced
to at most two calls to a SAT-solver (e.g., [2,41]); note that reducing problems to
satisfiability checking proved useful in other contexts [23].
Our complexity results for the notion of weak cause proved useful for analyzing the
computational aspects of explanations and partial explanations as introduced by Halpern
and Pearl [17], which are crucially based on the notion of weak cause. Roughly speaking,
an explanation is a minimal expression X = x that justifies an event φ with respect to a set
of contexts, through X = x being a weak cause of φ in all contexts where X = x holds; see
[17,19] for a precise definition. As shown in a companion paper [7], the conceptually more
involved notion of explanation has also higher computational complexity than weak cause,
and resides at the third level of the polynomial hierarchy. Moreover, the restriction to binary
causal models makes the complexity drop by one level, as in the case of weak causality.
6.4. Open issues
The work in this paper provides a first step to detailed understanding of the
computational aspects of causality, as defined on Pearl’s causal models. Note that in a
recent paper, Hopkins [21] explores search-based strategies for computing actual cases
in both the general and restricted settings. While we have presented some basic results,
several issues remain open at this point, and settling them requires further efforts.
An interesting topic of future research is to explore whether there are restricted cases
in which testing causal relationships in the structural-model approach is tractable. For this
purpose, suitable classes of causal and probabilistic causal models need to be isolated,
which should be efficiently recognizable. These classes may be defined in terms of
conditions on the causal graph associated with a causal model. For example, probabilistic
causal irrelevance in stable causal models [10] can be tested in polynomial time, as it
coincides with path interception in their causal graphs. Other restrictions of causal models
(to decomposable causal graphs, and in particular to causal trees and layered causal graphs)
to obtain tractability of deciding the notions of weak and actual cause are presented in a
companion paper [6]. Further obvious conditions that work for some notions of causality
can be obtained by imposing bounds on the depth and the width of the causal graph.
Another issue is the development of algorithms and implementations. For this,
transformations of problems on causality to other problems in knowledge representation
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and reasoning might be considered. In particular, it would be interesting to see whether
existing computational logic systems can be profitably used as an implementation
framework for this purpose.
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Appendix A. Proofs for Section 3
Proof of Theorem 3.2 (continued). It remains to show that X is causally irrelevant to Y
given Z iff φ is a tautology.
(a) For every nonempty set of variables W ⊆ V \ X ∪ Y ∪ Z = {D1, . . . ,Dk−1} and
every value w ∈D(W), it holds Yxw(u)= Yx ′w(u) for all x, x ′ ∈D(X) and u ∈D(U), as
once a value for a given Di is fixed by w, the values assigned to X become irrelevant for Y .
Assume now W = ∅. Then, Yx1(u)= 1, and Yx0(u) is the truth value of φ under u ∈D(U).
Thus, Yx(u)= Yx ′(u) for all u ∈D(U) and x, x ′ ∈D(X) iff φ is a tautology. In summary,
Yxw(u)= Yx ′w(u) for all W ⊆ V \X ∪ Y ∪Z and all values u ∈D(U), x, x ′ ∈D(X), and
w ∈ D(W) iff φ is a tautology. That is, X is causally irrelevant to Y given Z iff φ is a
tautology.
(b) Since V = X ∪ Y ∪ Z, it holds W = ∅. Observe that Y ix(u) = Y i(u) = Y ix ′(u) for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, x, x ′ ∈D(X), and u ∈D(U), since no Y i is influenced by X. Moreover,
Y k+1x1 (u)= 1, and Y k+1x0 (u) is set to the truth value of φ under the truth assignment given
by u ∈D(U). Thus, Y k+1x0 (u)= Y k+1x1 (u) for all u ∈D(U) iff φ is a tautology. In summary,
this shows that Yx(u)= Yx ′(u) for all u ∈D(U) and x, x ′ ∈D(X) iff φ is a tautology. That
is, X is causally irrelevant to Y given Z iff φ is a tautology. ✷
Proof of Theorem 3.3. The problem in (a) (respectively, (b)) is in NP, since values
x, x ′ ∈ D(X) and u ∈ D(U) such that Yx(u) = Yx ′(u) (respectively, Yxz(u) = Yx ′z(u))
can be guessed and verified in polynomial time, by Proposition 2.3.
We next show NP-hardness. As X is a cause of Y iff X is a cause of Y in the context
Z = ∅, the problem in (a) is a special case of the one in (b). It is thus sufficient to show
NP-hardness for (a). We give a polynomial transformation from the NP-complete problem
of deciding whether a given propositional formula in 3DNF φ = φ1 ∨ · · · ∨ φk on the
variables A1, . . . ,An, where k,n 1, is not a tautology.
We now construct M = (U,V,F ) and X,Y ⊆ V , where M is binary and bounded, and
X,Y are singletons, such that X is a cause of Y iff φ is not a tautology.
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We define the causal model M = (U,V,F ) as in the proof of Theorem 3.2 for the case
(1)–(3) and (4b). The corresponding causal graph is shown in Fig. 4. We then define the
sets of endogenous variables X,Y ⊆ V by X = {A} and Y = {B}. The values 0 and 1 of X
are denoted by x0 and x1, respectively.
Then, Yx1(u)= 1 for all u ∈D(U), and Yx0(u) is set to the truth value of φ under the
truth assignment given by u ∈ D(U). Thus, Yx0(u) = Yx1(u) for all u ∈ D(U) iff φ is a
tautology. That is, Yx(u)= Yx ′(u) for all x, x ′ ∈D(X) and u ∈D(U) iff φ is a tautology.
That is, Yx(u) = Yx ′(u) for some x, x ′ ∈D(X) and u ∈D(U) iff φ is not a tautology. That
is, X is a cause of Y iff φ is not a tautology. ✷
Proof of Theorem 3.4. (a) The problem is in NP, since values x, x ′ ∈D(X), u ∈D(U),
and z ∈D(V \X∪Y ) such that Yxz(u) = Yx ′z(u) can be guessed and verified in polynomial
time, by Proposition 2.3.
To show NP-hardness, we give a polynomial transformation from the following
NP-complete problem. Given a propositional formula in 3DNF φ = φ1 ∨ · · · ∨ φk on the
variables A1, . . . ,An, where k,n 1, decide whether φ is not a tautology.
We define the causal model M = (U,V,F ) and the sets of endogenous variables
X,Y ⊆ V as in the proof of Theorem 3.2 for the case (1)–(3) and (4b). As shown
there, Yx(u) = Yx ′(u) for all x, x ′ ∈ D(X) and u ∈ D(U) iff φ is a tautology. That is,
Yx(u) = Yx ′(u) for some x, x ′ ∈D(X) and u ∈D(U) iff φ is not a tautology. That is, X is
a direct cause of Y iff φ is not a tautology.
As M is binary and bounded, X is a singleton, and V =X ∪ Y , hardness holds even in
this restricted case.
(b) The problem is in DP, as it can be expressed as the logical conjunction of a problem
in NP and a problem in co-NP, by (a) and Theorem 3.3(a).
Hardness for DP is shown by a polynomial transformation from the following
DP-complete problem [31]. Given two propositional formulas in 3DNF α = α1 ∨ · · · ∨αk
and β = β1 ∨ · · · ∨ βl on the variables A1, . . . ,Am and B1, . . . ,Bn, respectively (where
k, l,m,n  1), decide whether α is a tautology and β is not a tautology. Without loss of
generality, α and β do not share any variables.
We now construct a causal model M = (U,V,F ) and X,Y ⊆ V , where M is binary
and bounded, and X is a singleton, such that X is an indirect cause of Y iff α is a tautology
and β is not a tautology.
We define the causal model M = (U,V,F ) as follows. The exogenous and en-
dogenous variables are defined by U = {B1, . . . ,Bn} and V = {A,A1, . . . ,Am,B,C1,
. . . ,Ck+1,D1, . . . ,Dl}, respectively, where D(S) = {0,1} for all S ∈ U ∪ V . The func-
tions F = {FS | S ∈ V } are defined as follows:
• FS = 1 for all S ∈ {A,A1, . . . ,Am,B},
• FC1 =A∨ α1,
• FCi = Ci−1 ∨ αi for all i ∈ {2, . . . , k},
• FCk+1 = Ck ∨B ,
• FD1 = B ∨ β1,
• FDi =Di−1 ∨ βi for all i ∈ {2, . . . , l}.
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Fig. A.1. Causal graph for DP-hardness of indirect cause.
The corresponding causal graph is shown in Fig. A.1. We define the sets of variables
X,Y ⊆ V by X = {B} and Y = {C1, . . . ,Ck+1,Dl}. Then, Z = V \(X ∪ Y ) = {A,
A1, . . . ,Am,D1, . . . ,Dl−1}. We use Y 1, . . . , Y k+1, Y 0 to denote C1, . . . ,Ck+1, Dl . The
values 0 and 1 of X are denoted by x0 and x1, respectively.
We now prove that X is an indirect cause of Y iff α is a tautology and β is not a
tautology. More precisely, we first show that X is not a direct cause of Y iff α is a tautology.
We then prove that X is a cause of Y iff β is not a tautology.
Observe that Y 0x1z(u) = Y 0z (u) = Y 0x0z(u) for all z ∈ D(Z) and u ∈ D(U). Moreover,
Y ix1z(u) = Y iz (u) = Y ix0z(u) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, z ∈ D(Z), and u ∈ D(U), as no Y i is
influenced by X. Finally, Y k+1x1z (u)= 1 for all z ∈D(Z) and u ∈D(U), and Y k+1x0z (u) is set
to the truth value of A∨ α under z ∈D(Z), for all u ∈D(U). Hence, Y k+1x1z (u)= Y k+1x0z (u)
for all z ∈D(Z) and u ∈D(U) iff α is a tautology. In summary, Yxz(u)= Yx ′z(u) for all
x, x ′ ∈D(X), z ∈D(Z), and u ∈D(U) iff α is a tautology. That is, X is not a direct cause
of Y iff α is a tautology.
Observe then that Y ix1(u) = 1 = Y ix0(u) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k + 1} and u ∈D(U), since
FA = 1. Furthermore, Y 0x1(u) = 1 for all u ∈ D(U), and Y 0x0(u) is set to the truth value
of β under u ∈ D(U). Thus, Y 0x0(u) = Y 0x1(u) for all u ∈ D(U) iff β is a tautology. In
summary, Yx(u)= Yx ′(u) for all x, x ′ ∈D(X) and u ∈D(U) iff β is a tautology. That is,
Yx(u) = Yx ′(u) for some x, x ′ ∈D(X) and u ∈D(U) iff β is not a tautology. That is, X is
a cause of Y iff β is not a tautology. ✷
Appendix B. Proofs for Section 4
Proof of Theorem 4.3. (a) The problem is in DP, as it can be expressed as the logical
conjunction of a problem in co-NP and a problem in NP. In detail, a context u ∈D(U) such
that ¬φx(u) can be guessed and verified in polynomial time, by Proposition 4.1. Hence,
deciding whether (i) holds is in co-NP. Moreover, two values x ′ ∈ D(X) and u′ ∈ D(U)
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such that x ′ = x and ¬φx ′(u′) can also be guessed and verified in polynomial time, by
Proposition 4.1. Thus, deciding whether (ii) holds is in NP. In summary, deciding whether
(i) and (ii) hold is in DP.
Hardness for DP is shown by a polynomial transformation from the following DP-
complete problem [31]. Given two propositional formulas in 3DNF α = α1 ∨ · · · ∨αk
and β = β1 ∨ · · · ∨ βl on the variables A1, . . . ,Am and B1, . . . ,Bn, respectively (where
k, l,m,n  1), decide whether α is a tautology and β is not a tautology. Without loss of
generality, α and β do not share any variables.
We now construct M = (U,V,F ), X,Y ⊆ V , x ∈ D(X), and y ∈ D(Y), where M is
binary and bounded, and X is a singleton, such that X = x always causes Y = y iff α is a
tautology and β is not a tautology.
We define the causal model M = (U,V,F ) as follows. The exogenous and endogenous
variables are defined by U = {A1, . . . ,Am,B1, . . . ,Bn} and V = {A,C1, . . . ,Ck,D1, . . . ,
Dl}, respectively, where D(S)= {0,1} for all S ∈ U ∪ V . The functions F = {FS | S ∈ V }
are defined as follows:
• FA = 1,
• FC1 =A∨ α1,
• FCi = Ci−1 ∨ αi for all i ∈ {2, . . . , k},
• FD1 =¬A∨ β1,
• FDi =Di−1 ∨ βi for all i ∈ {2, . . . , l}.
The corresponding causal graph is shown in Fig. B.1. We define the endogenous variables
X,Y ⊆ V by X = {A} and Y = {Ck,Dl}. We write Y 0 and Y 1 to denote Ck and Dl ,
respectively. The values 0 and 1 of X are denoted by x0 and x1, respectively. Let y ∈D(Y)
be defined by y(Y 0)= y(Y 1)= 1. We now prove that X = x0 always causes Y = y iff α is
a tautology and β is not a tautology.
We have Y 1x0(u) = 1 for all u ∈ D(U), and Y 0x0(u) = 1 for all u ∈ D(U) iff α is a
tautology. Hence, Yx0(u)= y for all u ∈D(U) iff α is a tautology.
Moreover, Y 0x1(u)= 1 for all u ∈D(U), and Y 1x1(u) = 1 for some u ∈D(U) iff β is not
a tautology. Thus, Yx1(u) = y for some u ∈D(U) iff β is not a tautology.
Fig. B.1. Causal graph for DP-hardness of necessary cause.
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In summary, Yx0(u)= y for all u ∈D(U) and Yx1(u′) = y for some u′ ∈D(U), iff α is a
tautology and β is not a tautology. That is, X= x0 always causes Y = y iff α is a tautology
and β is not a tautology.
(b) The problem is in NP, as some values x ′ ∈ D(X) and u ∈ D(U) such that
x = x ′, X(u) = x , ψ(u), and ¬ψx ′(u) can be guessed and verified in polynomial time,
by Propositions 2.3 and 4.1.
Hardness for NP is shown by a polynomial transformation from the following
NP-complete problem. Given a propositional formula in 3DNF φ = φ1 ∨ · · · ∨ φk on the
variables A1, . . . ,An, where k,n 1, decide whether φ is not a tautology.
We define the causal model M = (U,V,F ), the sets of variables X,Y ⊆ V , and the
values x0, x1 ∈ D(X) as in the proof of Theorem 3.3. Observe that M is binary and
bounded, and that X,Y are singletons. We now show that X = x1 may have caused Y = 1
iff φ is not a tautology.
Observe that x1 = x0, and that X(u)= x1 and Y (u)= 1 for all u ∈D(U), since FA = 1.
As argued in the proof of Theorem 3.3, Yx0(u) = 1 for all u ∈D(U) iff φ is a tautology.
Equivalently, Yx0(u) = 1 for some u ∈D(U) iff φ is not a tautology. In summary, X = x1
may have caused Y = 1 iff φ is not a tautology. ✷
Proof of Theorem 4.4 (continued). It remains to show that X = x is a weak cause of φ
under u iff Φ is true. Clearly, X(u)= 0 and Y (u)= 1. That is, AC1 holds. We now show
that AC2 holds iff Φ is true.
(⇒) Assume AC2 holds. That is, some W ⊆ V \ X, x ∈D(X), and w ∈ D(W) exist
such that Yxw(u)= 0 and Yxwz(u)= 1 for all Z ⊆ V \ (X ∪W) and z=Z(u). Notice that
x = x and H /∈W , as otherwise Yxw(u) = Yxw(u). Moreover, C ∈W and w(C) = 1, as
otherwise Yxw(u)= 1. Observe then thatB∩W = ∅, as otherwise Yxw(u)= 1 if S ∈ B∩W
and w(S) ∈ {0,1}, and Yxw(u)= 0 if S ∈ B ∩W and w(S)= 2. This shows W \ {C} ⊆ A.
Observe that Sxw(u) = 0 for all S ∈ A \ W . Define now the truth assignment I to the
variables in A by I (S) = true, iff S ∈ W and w(S) = 1. Notice then that Sxw(u) = 1
and S(u) = 0, for all S ∈ B . Given any truth assignment J to the variables in B , let Z
be the set of all S ∈ B with J (S) = false, and let z = Z(u). In summary, for all S ∈ A,
we have Sxwz(u)= 0 iff I (S)= false. Moreover, for all S ∈ B , we have Sxwz(u) ∈ {0,1},
and Sxwz(u)= 0 iff J (S)= false. As AC2 holds, we have Yxwz(u)= 1. That is, φ′xwz(u)
is true, or equivalently, γ ′xwz(u) is true, which is equivalent to γ being true in I ∪ J . In
summary, a truth assignment I to the variables in A exists such that γ is true in I ∪ J for
all truth assignments J to the variables in B . That is, Φ is true.
(⇐) Assume Φ is true. That is, there exists a truth assignment I to the variables in A
such that γ is true in I ∪ J for all truth assignments J to the variables in B . Define
x = 1, W = {C} ∪ A, w(C) = 1, and w(S) = 1 iff I (S) = true, for all S ∈ A. We now
show that AC2(a) and (b) hold. As Sxw(u)= 2 for all S ∈ B , it follows Yxw(u)= 0. That
is, AC2(a) holds. Consider next any Z ⊆ V \ (X ∪W) and z = Z(u). Assume first that
Y ⊆ Z. As Y (u) = 1, it then follows Yxwz(u) = 1. Assume next that Z ⊆ B . Define the
truth assignment J to the variables in B by J (S) = false iff S ∈ Z. In summary, for all
S ∈ A, we now have Sxwz(u) = 0 iff I (S) = false. Moreover, for all S ∈ B , we have
Sxwz(u) ∈ {0,1}, and Sxwz(u) = 0 iff J (S) = false (as Sxw(u) = 1 and S(u) = 0). As
γ is true in I ∪ J , it thus follows that γ ′xwz(u) holds. As Sxwz(u) ∈ {0,1} for all S ∈ B ,
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we then get Yxwz(u)= 1. In summary, some W ⊆ V \X, x ∈D(X), and w ∈D(W) exist
such that Yxwz(u)= 1 for all Z ⊆ V \ (X ∪W) and z=Z(u). That is, AC2(b) holds. ✷
Proof of Theorem 4.5 (continued). We show that for binary causal models M , condition
AC2 is equivalent to the following condition AC2′′. By AC2′′(c), setting Z′ to z′ is
immaterial in φxw′z′(u) of AC2′′(b). Thus, AC2′′ is in fact equivalent to AC2′. This then
proves the theorem.
AC2′′. Some set of endogenous variables W ′ ⊆ V \ X and some values x′ ∈ D(X) and
w′ ∈D(W ′) exist such that:
(a) ¬φx′w′(u),
(b) φxw′z′(u) for all Z′ ⊆ V \ (X ∪W ′) and z′ =Z′(u),
(c) Zˆ′
xw′(u)= Zˆ′(u) for Zˆ′ = V \ (X ∪W ′).
(⇐) Trivially, AC2′′ implies AC2.
(⇒) Assume that AC2 holds. Then, define Z = V \ (X ∪ W). Moreover, define the
values z, z ∈D(Z) by z= Zxw(u) and z= Zxw(u). Let Z8 denote the set of all variables
I ∈ Z such that either (α) z(I) = z(I) or (β) z(I) = z(I) and I (u) = z(I). Notice now
that for binary variables I , condition (β) implies z(I)= I (u). Observe also that I ∈Z \Z8
implies I (u) = z(I). Define now W ′ =W ∪ Z8 and Zˆ′ = Z \ Z8, and define the values
x′ ∈D(X), w′ ∈D(W ′) by x′ = x, w′|W =w, and w′|Z8 = z|Z8. It is now easy to verify
that AC2′′(a) and (b) hold. However, condition AC2′′(c) does not necessarily hold. But we
can clearly iterate the just described construction until AC2′′(c) holds. ✷
Proof of Theorem 4.6. We first show membership in NP. By Theorem 4.5, it holds that
X = x is a weak cause of φ under u iff (i) X(u)= x and φ(u), and (ii) some W ⊆ V \X,
x ∈D(X), and w ∈D(W) exist such that (a) ¬φxw(u), (b) φxw(u), and (c) Zxw(u)=Z(u)
for Z = V \ (X∪W). By Propositions 2.3 and 4.1, deciding (i) is polynomial. In (ii), some
W ⊆ V \X, x ∈D(X), and w ∈D(W) such that (a) to (c) hold can be guessed and verified
in polynomial time, by Propositions 2.3 and 4.1. In summary, deciding whether (i) and (ii)
hold is in NP.
To show NP-hardness, we give a polynomial transformation from the following
NP-complete problem. Given a propositional formula in 3DNF φ = φ1 ∨ · · · ∨ φk on the
variables A1, . . . ,An, where k,n 1, decide whether φ is not a tautology.
We now construct M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , x ∈ D(X), u ∈ D(U), and a primitive
event φ such that X = x is a weak cause of φ under u iff φ is not a tautology.
We define the causal model M = (U,V,F ) as follows. The exogenous and endogenous
variables are defined by U = {C} and V = {A,A1, . . . ,An,D1, . . . ,Dk}, respectively,
where D(S) = {0,1} for all S ∈ U ∪ V . The functions F = {FS | S ∈ V } are defined as
follows:
• FS = 1 for all S ∈ {A,A1, . . . ,An},
• FD1 =A∨ φ1,
• FDi =Di−1 ∨ φi for all i ∈ {2, . . . , k}.
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The corresponding causal graph is similar to the one shown in Fig. 3. We define X = {A},
Y = {Dk}, and T = {A1, . . . ,An}. The values 0 and 1 of X are denoted by x0 and x1,
respectively. Let x = x1 and u ∈ D(U). Let φ be defined as Y = 1. We now show that
X = x is a weak cause of φ under u iff φ is not a tautology.
Observe first that for all W ⊆ V \X with W  T , w ∈D(W), and u ∈D(U), it holds
that Yxw(u)= Yx ′w(u) for all x, x ′ ∈D(X). For all W ⊆ V \X with W ⊆ T , w ∈D(W),
and u ∈D(U), we have Yx1w(u)= 1, and Yx0w(u) is set to the truth value of φ under the
truth assignment I :T → {0,1} given by I (S) =w(S) for all S ∈W and by I (S) = 1 for
all S ∈ T \W .
By Theorem 4.5, X = x1 is a weak cause of φ under u iff (i) X(u)= x1 and Y (u)= 1,
and (ii) some W ⊆ V \ X, x ∈ D(X), and w ∈ D(W) exist such that Yxw(u) = 1,
Yx1w(u) = 1, and Zx1w(u)= Z(u) for Z = V \ (X ∪W). Obviously, (ii) implies x = x0.
Clearly, (i) holds. By the argumentation above, (ii) is equivalent to the existence of some
W ⊆ T and w ∈D(W) such that Yx0w(u) = 1 and Zx1w(u)=Z(u) for Z = V \ (X ∪W).
Observe then that Sx1w(u)= 1= S(u) for all S ∈Z = (T \W)∪{D1, . . . ,Dk}. Hence, (ii)
is in fact equivalent to the existence of some W ⊆ T and w ∈D(W) such that Yx0w(u) = 1.
By the argumentation above, this condition is in turn equivalent to φ not being a tautology.
In summary, X = x is a weak cause of φ under u iff φ is not a tautology. Observe that
M is bounded, X is a singleton, and φ is primitive. ✷
Appendix C. Proofs for Section 5
Proof of Lemma 5.7. The problem is in C=, as it is a special case of the following C=-
complete problem E-SAT, mentioned in the discussion of [39]: Given a Boolean formula φ
and an integer m, decide whether φ has exactly m satisfying truth assignments. Hardness
holds even if φ is a CNF.
Hardness for C= is shown by a polynomial transformation from E-SAT, using similar
techniques as in [37,40]. Let φ be a Boolean formula on the atoms x1, . . . , xn with n 1,
and let m be an integer. We now construct a Boolean formula φ′ on the atoms x0, x1, . . . , xn
such that φ has exactly m satisfying truth assignments to the atoms x1, . . . , xn iff φ′ has
exactly 2n satisfying truth assignments to the atoms x0, x1, . . . , xn.
If m = 0, then φ has no satisfying truth assignments to x1, . . . , xn iff φ′ = x0 ∨ φ has
exactly 2n satisfying truth assignments to x0, x1, . . . , xn. Otherwise, let b1 · · ·bn be the
binary representation of 2n−m, that is, 2n−m=∑ni=1 bi · 2i−1. We identify 0 and 1 with
the propositional constants false and true, respectively. We define φ′ = (x0 ∨φ0)∧ (¬x0 ∨
φ), where:
φ0 =
n∨
i=1
(
bi ∧¬xi ∧
(
n∧
j=i+1
bj ≡ xj
))
.
Roughly, a truth assignment I to the atoms x1, . . . , xn satisfies φ0 iff it is lexicographically
smaller than b1 · · ·bn, where the truth values false and true are identified with 0
and 1, respectively. Thus, φ0 has exactly 2n − m satisfying truth assignments to the
atoms x1, . . . , xn. Hence, φ has exactly m satisfying truth assignments to x1, . . . , xn
iff φ′ has exactly 2n satisfying truth assignments to x0, x1, . . . , xn.
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If we start from a DNF φ, then the construction yields a formula φ′ which is easily
rewritten to a DNF. Obviously, C=-hardness of E-SAT for CNFs implies also C=-hardness
for DNFs, and φ′ is a Yes-Instance of HALFSAT iff ¬φ′ is a Yes-Instance of HALFSAT. It
follows that HALFSAT is C=-hard for both CNFs and DNFs φ. ✷
Proof of Lemma 5.9. The problem is in C, as it is a special case of the following
C-complete problem GE-SAT: Given a Boolean formula φ and an integer m, decide
whether φ has at least m satisfying truth assignments.
Hardness for C is shown by a polynomial transformation from GE-SAT. Let φ be a
Boolean formula on the atoms x1, . . . , xn with n  1, and let m be an integer. Let the
Boolean formula φ′ on the atoms x0, x1, . . . , xn be defined as in the proof of Lemma 5.7.
Then, φ has at least m satisfying truth assignments to x1, . . . , xn iff φ′ has at least 2n
satisfying truth assignments to x0, x1, . . . , xn. Hardness under restriction to CNFs and
DNFs φ follows by similar arguments as in Lemma 5.7. ✷
Proof of Theorem 5.10. As for membership in C, recall that ψ occurred despite X = x
with goodness α, iff (i) ψ(u) and X(u)= x for some u∈D(U), and (ii) P([X← x]ψ)
1−α, that is, P([X← x]¬ψ)  α. Guessing some u ∈ D(U) and verifying that ψ(u)
and X(u)= x hold can be done in polynomial time by Proposition 4.1. That is, deciding
whether (i) holds is in NP and thus by Fig. 2 in C. By Theorem 5.8, deciding whether
(ii) holds is in C. As C is closed under polynomial-time conjunctive reductions [3], the
problem is in C.
Hardness for C is shown by a reduction from GE-HALFSAT. Let φ be a Boolean
formula on the atoms A1, . . . ,An with n  1. Without loss of generality, φ is not a
tautology.
We define the causal model M = (U,V,F ), the probability distribution P, and the sets
of variables X,Y ⊆ V as in the proof of Theorem 5.4. Denote by x1 the value 1 of X, and
define ψ as Y = 0. Let α = 0.5. Observe that M is binary and bounded, P is the uniform
distribution, X is a singleton, and ψ is primitive.
By the proof of Theorem 5.4, for every u ∈D(U), it holds that Yx1(u)= 1 iff φ is true
under u. Hence, we have P([X←x1]¬ψ)=m ·2−n, and thus P([X←x1]ψ)= 1−m ·2−n,
where m is the number of satisfying truth assignments of φ. Hence, (ii) P([X← x1]ψ)
1 − α holds, iff at least 2n−1 truth assignments to A1, . . . ,An satisfy φ. As φ is not
a tautology, (i) ψ(u) and X(u) = x1 for some u ∈ D(U). In summary, ψ occurred
despite X = x with goodness α, iff at least half of the truth assignments to A1, . . . ,An
satisfy φ. ✷
Proof of Theorem 5.12. As for membership in C, recall that X = x is a likely cause of ψ
with goodness α, iff (i) φ(u) and f (u) > 0 for some u ∈D(U), and (ii) P([X← x]φ ∧
[X← x ′]¬φ | φ) α for some x ′ ∈D(X) \ {x}. Guessing some u ∈D(U) and verifying
that φ(u) and f (u) > 0 hold is polynomial, by Proposition 4.1 and Assumption (3) in
Section 2.2. Hence, deciding whether (i) holds is in NP, and thus by Fig. 2 also in C.
By Theorem 5.11, deciding whether P([X← x]φ ∧ [X← x ′]¬φ | φ) α for some fixed
x ′ ∈D(X) \ {x} is in C. As C is closed under polynomial-time disjunctive reductions [3],
and by Assumption (2) in Section 2.2, deciding whether (ii) holds is in C. In summary, as
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C is closed under polynomial-time conjunctive reductions [3], deciding whether (i) and (ii)
hold is in C.
Hardness for C is shown by a reduction from GE-HALFSAT. Let φ be a Boolean
formula on the atoms A1, . . . ,An with n 1.
Let the causal model M = (U,V,F ) be defined as in the proof of Theorem 5.4, except
that the function FB = Dφ ≡ A is replaced by FB = ¬Dφ ∨ A. Let P be the uniform
distribution over D(U). Let X = {A} and Y = {B}. Denote by x0 and x1 the values 0
and 1, respectively, of X, and define ψ as Y = 1. Let α = 0.5. Observe that M is binary
and bounded, X is a singleton, and ψ is primitive.
We now show that X = x1 is a likely cause of ψ with goodness α iff at least half of
the truth assignments to A1, . . . ,An satisfy φ. Observe first that for every u ∈ D(U), it
holds (M,u) |= ψ and (M,u) |= [X← x1]ψ . Thus, ψ(u) and f (u) > 0 for all u ∈D(U).
Moreover, (ii) P([X ← x1]ψ ∧ [X ← x ′] ¬ψ | ψ)  α for some x ′ ∈ D(X) \ {x1} is
equivalent to P(Yx0 = 0)  α. Notice now that (M,u) |= Yx0 = 0 iff φ is true under u.
Hence, P(Yx0 = 0) = m · 2−n, where m is the number of satisfying truth assignments
of φ. Thus, P(Yx0 = 0)  α iff at least 2n−1 truth assignments to A1, . . . ,An satisfy φ.
In summary, X = x1 is a likely cause of ψ with goodness α, iff at least half of the truth
assignments to A1, . . . ,An satisfy φ. ✷
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